ABSTRACT UC security realized with setup devices imposes that single instances of these setups are used. In most cases, UC-realization relies further on other properties of the setups devices, like tamperresistance. But what happens in stronger versions of the UC framework, like EUC or JUC, where multiple instances of these setups are allowed? Can we formalise what it is about setups like these which makes them sometimes hinder UC, JUC, EUC realizability?
INTRODUCTION
UC-composable [5] cryptographic primitives give us the very sought-after secure guarantees when it comes to the design of cryptographic protocols. And, the skeptical can even go beyond and aim for stronger models, like the JUC (joint-state UC), EUC (externalized UC), GUC (generalized UC) [6] , where realizability is even harder. However there is a fundamentally limiting impossibility result by Canetti et al. [7] : two-party secure computations are UC-impossible in the UC plain model. To bypass this, the UC models are augmented with helping building blocks, also called (UC) setups.
In this paper, we look at designing composable cryptographic primitives, especially in stronger UC frameworks (like JUC, EUC) and at how relaying comes in the way of that. We link relay attacks to whether they are apparent/visible at the level of the crypto setups used therein, via the notion of transferable setups. An instance of such setups is given by the much spoken-of PUFs (physical unclonable functions) [17, 24, 16, 10, 13, 25] . We then look at how the often-assumed authenticated channels have come to defeat relaying within the UC framework.
For completeness, we will first summarize the general settings of UC models with and without setups, underlining certain important details on the communication model and the legitimate use of setups.
A UC overview.
Plain UC. In the UC framework, we consider several participants and an environment. They all run their purported algorithms. Some participants may be corrupted, in which case they behave as the adversary instructs them to. Participants receive inputs from the environment and send their final outputs to the environment. It is assumed that all algorithms are probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. The UC models comprises two symbolic worlds that should behave similarly, i.e., a real world where the protocol π is run, and an ideal world where the idealized version of the protocol is executed; this idealized version is usually denoted via an ideal (target) functionality F target . Let us detail slightly. In the real world, a set of honest participants is assumed to run their corresponding part of π. In the ideal world, honest participants are "dummies" who just forward inputs/outputs to the ideal functionality F target . We say that this functionality is UC-realized by the protocol π if for every real adversary, there exists an ideal adversary (also called simulator) such that for every environment Z, the real and the ideal worlds are indistinguishable in terms of the output of Z. This definition is accompanied by a composition theorem: every complex experiment using one instance of π as a subroutine emulates a corresponding experiment using (the dummy protocol based on) F target instead.
This substitution can of course be used recursively.
Communication Models in UC. In the original UC papers [5] , it was assumed that the channels were secure; we will henceforth refer to that UC-model as the secure-channel UC. However, this assumption was consequently [6] dropped; we will henceforth refer to this later UC-model as the insecure-channel UC. The latter means that in the case of honest real-world executions, one can imagine man-in-the-middle adversaries mounting attacks. To bypass this issue, most UC-secure constructions assume or intrinsically require authenticated channels between the participants 1 . Participants can identify where an incoming message comes from and where an outgoing message goes to. Note that the UC models also assume that such authenticated channels are not visible to the adversary.
Hybrid UC. Unfortunately, virtually no interesting ideal functionalities can be realized by protocols in the plain UC setting [7] . So, one turns to the hybrid model, where participants can further access a setup functionality F setup , in both the real and the ideal worlds. This defines the F setup -UC-realization. Roughly speaking, a protocol π is said to be realized in the F setup -hybrid model if π is now built using calls to the ideal functionality F setup , in such a way that one instance of the corresponding "physical" setup will only be used in one protocol session of π. One clear disadvantage is that composition only works for one single session of π which is using a "physical" instance of the setup given via F setup at one point in time. Namely, such a F setup UC-functionality is always so that it models the following: "duplicates" of the (physical) UC setup-device that F setup is modelling will be issued for every new session of π. Moreover, no other process should access F setup when π is already using it (i.e., the environment Z cannot directly access F setup ). In UC terms, for π to be UC-composable using F setup , π needs to be "subroutine respecting" [6] .
EUC and GUC. From UC, one moves to the EUC formalization [6] by allowing the environment to access the F setup as well.
EUC-realization and EUC-composition are simply UC-realization and UC-composition respectively where the environment is empowered in this way. I.e., EUC still refers to one session of a protocol, but -in EUC-all parties have access to a global setup, even if it is still only one (physical) instance of such a setup. In the GUC framework [6] , the environment is even more powerful as he has access to other protocols running simultaneously in the network. Also, in GUC, the target protocol has several simultaneously running sessions, which the GUC-environment can have adaptive (I/O) access to. GUC-realization is defined with respect to this all-powerful environment. A result of equivalence between some type of GUC-composition and some type of EUC-composition exists [6] . For this equivalence to hold, the communication is restricted again, in that it still only allows "subroutine-respecting" protocols. A protocol π is F setup -subroutine respecting if no subroutine of a party in π takes I/O from any non-subroutine of π (other than a single instance of F setup and the environment). With such a restriction in place, a weaker EUC-realization/EUC-composition is defined, i.e., EUC-realization that applies to F setup -subroutine respecting protocols, which was proven equivalent to the GUCrealization.
JUC. There also exists a model in between the hybrid-UC and EUC, namely JUC [9] . In the definition of the F setup -JUC realization, we consider several groups of participants, each running their own instance of π in the real world, and "playing" with their own instance of F target in the ideal world. The protocol participants can all jointly access F setup , but the environment cannot. The envi- 1 In the UC literature, it is not always clear when authenticated channels are assumed, but most of the UC protocols do implicitly rely on this assumption of the model. There are a few feasibility results without it [1] .
ronment must also provide all inputs at once, i.e., the simultaneous sessions of π cannot be initialized adaptively. This notion makes feasible a complex composition in some limited way. Namely, for each set of sessions of π which can only be initialized with inputs in parallel, we can substitute each session with an instance of F target , and use the same instance of F setup for this set (and this set only).
UC setups of interest. UC hybrid models, with setups of tamperevident and tamper-resistant devices, have been employed to UCrealize bit-commitments (COM), oblivious transfers (OT), coin flipping, polling schemes [15, 18, 14, 19, 20, 22, 21, 2, 3] , etc. More recently, a new type of tamper-resilient devices has been modelled as setups to create UC-secure OT and COM [4, 23] , namely PUFs (physically unclonable functions). Different assumptions [4] have been taken to model these PUFs: e.g., super-polynomial sizes of the input domains, well-spread domains, freshness of usage, honest behavior, etc. In [23] , malicious PUFs are also modelled.
Contributions.
I. In this paper, we first look at how UC setups can in fact lead to impossibility results in certain flavors of the UC model. To this end, we formalize transferable setups, which can be viewed as devices that do not (publicly) disclose if they have been maliciously passed on. For instance, transferable setups will not publicly output, e.g., the identifiers of the parties who are physically accessing them. We show that OT is not EUC-realizable if transferable setups are to be used. So, transferable setups cannot be global.
We will show that many of the well-known tamper-resilient devices, PUFs included, can be modelled as what we call transferable setups. More specifically, we show that those used in in [14, 19, 20, 22, 21, 2, 4, 23] can, while those used in [15, 18, 2] cannot.
II. We also formalize relay attacks in the context of using UC setups. Using this formalism, we then show that an OT protocol subject to a relay attack cannot be JUC-secure.
III. We then look at how relaying and PUFs were handled in the latest UC protocols using these setups. We observe that if PUFs are reusable amongst sessions, or that if we do not assume channel authentication within UC, then the OT protocol in [4] is not UCsecure in the F PUF -hybrid model.
We then show a manner to render the OT protocol in [4] even JUC-secure, by strengthening the protocol.
We discuss other related protocols and setups in the literature and obtain similar results with the protocols from [11, 12, 23] .
Organization. We define and observe transferable setup in Section 2. The EUC-impossibilities with transferable setups, as well as other related JUC-imposibilities are discussed in Section 3. We give several examples of transferable setups in Section 4. Section 5 shows how to make JUC-secure OT protocol out of from UCsecure OT protocol that uses transferable setup. We conclude in Section 6.
UC SETUPS, TRANSFERABILITY AND RELAYING
Intuitive description of transferability.
This section will give a mathematical expression for the following scenario.
Scenario for transferability. Assume that parties A, B and C are engaged in a communication protocol involving some setupdevice. Assume further that B and C are malicious, and A thinks she is communicating with B when in fact she is communicating with C. Roughly speaking, the setup used therein is transferable if the fact that A is mis-lead w.r.t. its interlocutor is not prevented by/via the outputs of this setup.
By separating the notions of party/participant, algorithm, and setup being used, this section will formalise the idea behind transferable setups. This is needed in order to formulate and prove a formal (E)UC impossibility result.
Participants, algorithms and transferability.
We distinguish between a physical participant (e.g., a computer, a HSM) and the actual algorithm that is run by this physical participant (e.g., the client-side SSH installed on a computer). We will now formalise how these participants and algorithms interact together within a protocol execution. E.g., pieces of software can interact together on the same machine, and each piece can independently deliver several outputs: an SSL client algorithm can send some messages directly on port 443 and some other messages to the network configuration daemon of the same physical machine.
Participants can be viewed as identifiable entities/parties taking part in real/idealized execution: e.g., a physical machine with an identifiable IP address. Participants, functionalities, and the environment run algorithms. They are connected with each others by some bi-directional channels. For simplicity, we assume only two ends for every channel. We assume that algorithms have different input/output communication ports which can be "plugged" to the port of other algorithms, or to the communication channel of a participant. I.e., in a real-world setting, this would be akin to one algorithm being called by another algorithm and/or used by a device/party. Also, algorithms are not aware how their communication ports are plugged. At the same time, honest participants are correctly "plugged". I.e., the SSL algorithm does not "care" on which port messages are delivered, but a correctly/standardly configured SSL server will have port 443 open and it will be listening on it.
Participants, functionalities, and the environment have an identifier. Algorithms could use the identifier of participants as part of their communication. I.e., the SSL-handshake algorithm will verify a certificate against a given hostname that identifies the server. Indeed, algorithms could receive such identifiers as input, e.g., to instruct them which role they are supposed to "play" and with whom they are supposed to communicate. This is akin to instantiated an object of a generic class with specific parameters, or calling a function with specific arguments, e.g., instantiate the server-side (object) of a program with a server-identifier called "server1" to speak to a client instantiated as "client3". To denote that an algorithm alg runs with some given identifiers id 1 , . . . , id n , we simply write alg(id 1 , . . . , id n ). These identifiers can also be hard-coded in the algorithm. For instance, we can assume that the algorithm of a UC setup functionality F setup is correctly "plugged" and that all identifiers are hard-coded. In this way, F setup always knows from which participant a message comes in, and to which participant a message is to be sent to. However, for participants and their algorithms, there is no guarantee that the "plugging" and/or the input-manipulation runs correctly. This is so since inputs can be (maliciously) handled, e.g., if the algorithm is run by a corrupted participant.
Transferability.
In the context of communicating parties, using setups, we will also formalize how an unobservable relay can be achieved, i.e., a relay that no party/setup can be aware of. To do so, we will introduce a series of experiments (i.e., interactive games of machines/participants and algorithms) depicted in Fig. 1 and denoted exp 1 , exp 2 , exp 1 and exp 2 .
The transferability/relay-defining experiments in Fig. 1 . Assume an arbitrary 2-party protocol defined by two algorithms sdr (sender) and rcv (receiver). We assume that sdr is designed to be run by party P 1 and to communicate with party P 2 , and that rcv is designed to be run by P 2 and to communicate with P 1 (I.e., this is as if the previously mentioned identifiers, here denoted P 1 and P 2 , were hard-coded in sdr and rcv). The participant denoted with Z is executing an arbitrary algorithm with two communication ports, no input (port) and one output (port). Both algorithms sdr and rcv have an input/output port (connected to Z), a setup port (connected to F setup ), and an extra communication port to communicate with their counterpart. This is depicted in the upper, leftmost part of Fig.1 , denoted exp 1 . In this experiment denoted exp 1 , P 1 indeed executes sdr (sender), P 2 executes rcv (receiver) with correctly connected communication ports. A second experiment is shown on the upper right part of Fig. 1 and is denoted exp 2 . In this second experiment exp 2 , P 3 is running two concurrent algorithms: the rcv (receiver) algorithm and tr
(some "relay-accommodating" translator).
The aim of experiments exp 1 and exp 2 in Fig. 1 . This is here is as follows: exp 2 will appear (to the outside world) just like exp 1 ., only that -in exp 2 -the outputs by the sdr algorithm are relayed from P 1 to the P 3 party, who is the one running the rcv algorithm in exp 2 ; All of this is done transparently to Z and all other parties involved. For this transparency to be achieved, we introduced the tr
: a mechanisation facilitating whatever translation (of identifiers) needs to take place. Intuitively, via tr
's "translation", the rcv (receiver) algorithm behaves as if it was run by P 2 communicating with P 1 in the upper part of exp 2 's last block, while in its lower part, rcv behaves as if it is run by P 3 communicating with P 2 .
We define similar experiments exp 1 and exp 2 , in a symmetric way.
The first communication port of Z is connected to P 1 in both experiments. The second port of Z is connected to (the channel of) P 2 in the first experiment, and to P 3 in the second experiment. The algorithm tr
uses two ports: the upper and the lower one. The input/output port of rcv is connected to Z, its communication port is connected to P 2 , and its setup port is connected to the upper port of tr
. The lower port of tr
is connected (to the channel) to F setup . In both experiments, we assume that P 1 executes sdr with correctly connected communication ports.
Let us now formalize the requirements of the setups, in order for the above (informal) transparent relaying to be the case. Definition 1. (Transferable Setup) Assume some participants and identifiers P 1 , P 2 , P 3 . Let F setup be a setup functionality and relay(P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) be an algorithm. We say that F setup is a relaytransferable setup if there exists some algorithms tr = tr
and tr = tr
such that for any 2-party protocol π = (alg 1 , alg 2 ) as per the above and any Z, the above experiments in (exp 1 , exp 2 ) and (exp 1 , exp 2 ) produce indistinguishable outcomes in each respective tuple.
In Section 4, we are going to show which "modern" UC setups are transferable and which are not; in anticipation, PUFs [4] are transferable, but tamper-resistant hardware [15] are not.
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We are now going to formalize the notion of relay attacks, in presence of transferable setups. (Fig. 2) ) Let F setup be a relaytransferable setup, for relay(P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ), P 1 , P 2 , P 3 as before. We consider a 2-party protocol π = (alg 1 (P 1 , P 2 ), alg 2 (P 1 , P 2 )) based on the functionality F setup in which sdr and rcv receive two hardcoded identifiers. We say that π is subject to relay attacks if for any Z, the two following experiments are indistinguishable to any environment: 1. participant P 1 runs sdr(P 1 , P 3 ) with the communication port connected (to the channel) to participant P 3 , participant P 3 runs rcv(P 1 , P 3 ) with the communication port connected (to the channel) to participant P 1 ; 2. participant P 1 runs sdr(P 1 , P 2 ) with the communication port connected (to the channel) to participant P 2 , participant P 3 runs rcv(P 2 , P 3 ) with the communication port connected (to the channel) to participant P 2 , participant P 2 runs relay(P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ), as per the definition of relay-transferable setups.
Definition 2. (Relay Attack

IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS IN UC WITH TRANSFERABLE SETUPS & RELAYING
In this section, we will see how transferability affects EUC-realization.
Transferable Setups & EUC-Impossibility
If F setup is a relay-transferable setup for some symmetric relay algorithm, then there is no protocol which F setup -EUC-realizes F OT .
The intuition of the proof.
The idea of the proof is classical. Start from the premise that an arbitrary protocol π = (alg s , alg r ) would F setup -EUC-realize F OT . Then, create a series of runs of this protocol and of the F OT functionality respectively, such that these runs are pair-wise and/or transitively indistinguishable, yet you arrive at some (distinguishabilitybased) contradiction. Thus, conclude that no such protocol π = (alg s , alg r ) could have in fact F setup -EUC realized F OT .
To get to this contradiction, we will basically use the existence of the ideal-world simulator Sim (given the initial presumption that π = (alg s , alg r ) would F setup -EUC-realize F OT say running with one of the inputs as a bit b). Then, this Sim must be able to "extract" the correct bit b to send to F OT . We will then make Sim internally available to a corrupt participant in a new (real-world) run of the protocol. The executions run via such a corrupt party (in the real world) will not be indistinguishably simulatable (in an ideal counterpart). To build the series of indistinguishable experiments we apply transformation steps provided either by the (supposed) F setup -EUC realization of F OT or by the definition of transferable setups.
Note1.
It seems intuitive that if a setup is transferable, then it loses "globality", hence it cannot serve as an EUC-setup. However, the separation between "globality" and non-transferability is not known. I.e., if a setup is non-global, it does not mean it is transferable,
nor do we know how many other well-distinguishable properties may lie between transferable and non-global, or between global and non-transferable. Moreover, this is the first time a compact class of global setups, which lead to lack of realizability, has been formally characterised.
Note2.
This proof strategy to be seen below (but not the methodology of symmetric algorithms and relay-transferable setups) is akin to that of splitting adversaries in [8] . Thus, our result above seems to also be an extension from UC-impossibility results to EUC-impossibility results, when the class of relay-transferable setups are used. Along similar lines, the above OT-impossibility result should extend and, like in [8] , apply to all same-output non-trivial 2-party protocols.
PROOF. We start with a protocol π = (alg s , alg r ) and assume contrary to our current theorem that π would F setup -EUC realize F OT . If this is the case then for every adversary that will corrupt π (in the real world), there exists a simulator running an algorithm Sim that would mimic it (in the ideal world) in such a way that no (EUC) environment Z can tell the difference (between the two worlds).
In what follows we consider an environment and three participants P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , together with F setup .
In the first three experiments, the environment is running and algorithm G generating two strings s 0 and s 1 and a bit b, sending s 0 and s 1 to a left participant and b to a right one, getting from the right participant some s, and giving as an outcome 1 if and only if s = s b .
In the first experiment, denoted exp 1 in Fig. 3 , the left participant is connected to P 1 who is running alg s with P 2 . The right one is connected to P 2 who is running alg r with P 1 . So, this experiment always outputs 1.
At the higher level, we can simply view exp 1 as P 1 running an honest sender-side algorithm and P 2 running an honest receiverside algorithm within an 1-out-of-2 two-party OT protocol π.
Using the transferability assumption (marked with "(1)" in Fig. 3 ), a direct consequence of Def. 1 shows that this is equivalent to a second experiment in which the left participant is still connected to P 1 , still running alg s with P 2 , but the right one is connected to P 3 , now running alg r and tr
with P 2 . The participant P 2 is now running relay(P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ). Please see the top two experiments of Fig. 3 .
At a higher level, this second experiment exp 2 shows how mainly the receiver-side is getting corrupted (and, above all, impersonated). I.e., the receiver-side is now being run by some P 3 , but P 1 thinks he is sending messages to some P 2 ; meanwhile, the receiverside messages produced inside P 3 will be received by the man-inthe-middle P 2 and then fed by P 2 back to P 1 .
We can define a new environment putting the old one and P 3 together (see the doted line on the second diagram in Fig. 3 , exp 2 and exp 3 ).
Thus, in exp 2 , we simply have an EUC environment (within exp 2 's dotted line) which runs the receiver-side inside himself, and we have an adversary in the person of P 2 who simply relays between this environment and an honest sender-side algorithm run inside P 1 . This EUC real-world execution now becomes fundamental to the proof (because we presumed it would be simulatable).
Let us apply the EUC-realizability assumption (marked with "(2)" in Fig. 3) . Then, this second, real-life EUC experiment exp 2 is equivalent to a third, ideal-life EUC experiment exp 3 . In exp 3 , P 1 is a dummy sender forwarding messages to F OT , P 2 is running a simulator exchanging messages with F OT , and the environment is as before, i.e., the (old, G-based) environment and P 3 are still being run as in exp 2 .
According to the assumption of EUC-realizability assumption,
Sim is able to produce a bit b to send to F OT , F OT gives him back a state s b such that, with a high probability, b = b and then s b is equal to s b (i.e., with s).
In the next experiments, the environment is still generating s 0 , s 1 , b, sending b to a right participant (who is still connected to P 3 at this time), waiting for a bit b from a left participant (that we connect to P 2 for the moment) and sending him back s b . The environment expects some s or s b from the right participant and outputs 1 if and only if s b = s b .
By redirecting the simulator's port to the environment (marked with "(3)" in Fig. 3) , we obtain an experiment which is obviously equivalent to the previous one. We denote by G the algorithm of the environment.
The simple step from exp 3 to exp 4 was first to include a simulated version of F OT inside the run done by Z. Then, (algorithm of) the dummy P 1 was also silently "pushed inside" Z. This is why we renamed his internal algorithm from G to G . This is possible without distinguishability repercussions since F OT does not state who queries what, i.e., it makes no public announcements that would hinter its simulated "inclusion" within Z, and P 1 did practically nothing.
We now apply the transferability with (P 3 , P 2 , P 1 ) (marked with "(4)" in Fig. 4) . We obtain that P 2 runs relay(P 3 , P 2 , P 1 ) with the
env.
env. left port connected to P 3 and the right port connected to P 1 . But, due to the symmetry, this is equivalent to relay(P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) with the left port connected to P 1 and the right port connected to P 3 . Now, P 1 is running the simulator connected to a translator. We apply again (marked with "(5)" in Fig. 4 ) the transferability (backwards) to move back to the situation where P 2 is running alg r correctly connected, and P 3 unused.
We have now arrived to some clearer, new real-world (UC) executions depicted in exp 6 . We can see it in the following way. Z is running an OT session called π 1 (on s 0 , s 1 , b) with a receiver in the person of P 2 . Out of this, Z gets s = s b from P 2 . And, P 1 interacts as a sender with the honest receiver P 2 according to the OT protocol π, in a session called π 3 . At the same time, Z is running another OT session called π 2 (on b ) with a (corrupt) party in the person of P 1 . P 1 is acting as an OT-receiver for Z inside π 2 . Out of this, Z should send s b to P 1 , where b is provided by P 1 via Sim. Since Sim should be able to extract b out of the run in π 3 , then with an overwhelming probability, b should be equal to b and then s b should be equal to s b with an overwhelming probability. So, in these real-world executions the environment with output 1, with an overwhelming probability. Finally, we apply (marked with "(6)" in Fig. 4 ) the EUC assumption again (actually, the UC assumption is enough in this case, since the environment is not using F setup ). Due to our reductions, in the ideal-world execution depicted in exp 7 , the output must also be 1 (except with negligible probability).
In exp 7 , in the session π 1 , we obtain that P 2 is honestly receiving a bit b and giving it to F OT , P 1 sends some s 0 , s 1 to F OT , F OT sends s b back to P 2 , P 2 then sends this s b as s back to Z. In the session π 2 , P 1 is running a simulator Sim to send some b to the environment Z, to get s b in return from Z.
The question is whether s b is still equal to s (like s b was in exp 6 ). Clearly, if b = b , then this holds with probability 1 (i.e., then s b = s b ≡ s). But if b = b (which happens with probability Given that there is at least one bit of information in s b , the outcome of the experiment is 1 with probability lower than 3 4 , which contradicts the initial assumption (i.e., exp 7 cannot perfectly emulate exp 6 , which goes back to exp 4 not perfectly emulating exp 3 , which refutes the EUC-realizability in the first place).
Other EUC impossibilities with transferable setups.
We believe that this can be taken further, to some other types of protocols (like the impossibility in [8] was). For instance, we can easily show with a similar proof the same result for commitment. 2 A natural question, given our results, is whether we can EUC-realize key exchange F KE (since practice likes to do key exchange with PUFs), based on transferable setups. The answer is that we cannot. THEOREM 2. If F setup is a relay-transferable setup for some symmetric relay algorithm, then there is no protocol which F setup -EUC-realizes F COM or F KE . The intuition of the proof.
If we have a protocol EUC-realizing F KE , we can consider an experiment with Alice and Bob, where Alice is malicious and just forwards everything to the environment. Due to transferability, this is the same as Alice and Bob running the protocol honestly. Due to EUC-security, there must be an ideal adversary who as follows.
First, this ideal adversary makes Alice and dummy Bob run F KE and get the exchanged key K. Then, it can simulate Bob's protocol to the environment running Alice's protocol in such a way that the protocol terminate with the key K. Now, take the algorithm of this ideal adversary and consider another experiment where Bob is malicious and running this algorithm. This will make a honest Alice terminate the KE protocol on a key K chosen by the environment and given to Bob. But now, it is clear that the ideal world cannot force F KE to make Alice receive some K chosen by the environment. So, there is a contradiction with EUC security.
Relaying & JUC-Impossibility
We now move to JUC-security and show that it is hindered by relay attacks, formalized in Def. 2. A who does the following: A relays the protocol sessions from S 1 to R 2 (as well as the physical setup instance, as per the transferability assumption). The above real-world execution is illustrated in Fig. 5 .
Due to the transferability assumption, this is indistinguishable from S 1 and R 2 running the protocol together. So, in this realworld execution, the environment outputs 1 with probability 1 (as he would do if S 1 and R 2 running the protocol together).
Let us now describe the corresponding ideal-world execution.
The ideal adversary Sim (namely Sim(R 1 )) learns s
β , but has no information about s β . Equally, Sim (namely Sim(S 2 )) knows nothing about b (2) . So, with the output by the dummy R 2 , in this idealworld execution, the environment outputs 1 with a probability close to 1 2 . Thus, we exemplified a JUC real-world execution of an arbitrary 1-out-of-2 2-party OT that is distinguishable from its ideal-world counterpart. Thus, OT is not JUC-secure in F setup -hybrid model, when F setup is transferable and relaying is possible. 6 ?
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ACTUAL TRANSFERABLE SETUP DE-VICES
Examples of transferable setups.
We will show prove/discuss the transferability of certain known UC setup devices. One of these is F PUF , modelling PUFs, as they were formalised in [4] . THEOREM 4. F PUF defined in [4] is relay-transferable setup.
PROOF. Let us consider a 2-party protocol π run using PUFs (i.e., F PUF ). We presume some hard-coded identifiers P 1 , P 2 , and two algorithms sdr, rcv respectively used by parties with these identifiers. Let the run of this protocol by the parties above denote an experiment called exp 1 (as in the left hand side of Fig. 1 ). Let P 3 be another hard-coded identifier, to be used by a third party. We will define two more algorithms, relay and tr and we will prove that -with P 1 , P 2 , P 2 , alg 1 , alg 2 , F PUF and relay and tr -we can build an execution of π, in an experiment exp 2 , indistinguishable from exp 1 . The same holds for exp 1 and exp 2 . Consequently, F PUF is relay-transferable setup as per Def. 1.
A relay algorithm: This is relaying messages in an intuitive way: whatever comes from the left port is forwarded to the right port and vice versa. Messages from F PUF are ignored except the notifications of a received handover: if relay receives (handover PUF , sid, P i ) for i = 1, 3, it sends back m = (handover PUF , sid, P j ) with j such that {i, j} = {1, 3} to forward the PUF to the other participant.
Since we consider 2-party protocols, whenever relay receives a message from F PUF , it could only have originated from sdr or rcv.
So, other handed over PUFs are just ignored by relay. A tr
algorithm: This translates identifiers in an intuitive way:
if it receives m = (init PUF , sid, P j ) from the top port, then tr
sends (init PUF , sid, P j ) to the bottom one. The response of form (initialized PUF , sid) from the bottom port is forwarded to the top one. If m = (eval PUF , P j , c) comes from the top, then tr
sends (init PUF , P j , c) to the bottom. Then, the response of form (eval ed PUF , sid, c, r) from the bottom is forwarded to the top. Finally, after it receives the message m = (handover PUF , sid, P j , P i ) from the top, (handover PUF , sid, P j , P i ) is sent by tr
to the bottom, and m = (handover PUF , sid, P i ) coming from the bottom makes tr
send the message (handover PUF , sid, P i ) to the top.
For P 1 = P 3 and P 2 = P 3 , we show by induction that any step in exp 1 matches one (or several) steps in exp 2 . So, the simulation is perfect.
Let us now consider other setup assumptions. Tamper-proof hardware is used in [15] and is described using F wrap . According to the definition, F wrap is not a transferable setup since it is assumed that the creator of the tamper-proof device intends to have this device be used only by one user, whose id is recorded in the device, and the thus-wise recorded id cannot be changed. Tamper-resistant devices F TA are building blocks in a model called the trusted agent model [18] ; like F wrap , F TA is not a transferable setup. This is because there is no opportunity for handing it over as per the device's definition in [18] . Tamper-evident envelopes presented in [21] can be considered relay-transferable setups, because such an envelope includes only the sender's id (and a value), and the envelope sent to a user can be diverted to another user. However, purported tamperevident envelopes F DE Oneseal (a variant of the above envelopes), proposed by [2] , are not transferable. It is because such an envelope is aimed only for an intended recipient and cannot be diverted to another recipient.
COMPOSABILITY & TRANSFERABLE DEVICES -FURTHER ASPECTS
We will now report on further issues with the UC-security of recent protocols that were particularly based on PUFs, which we showed above to be transferable devices. (These discussions could extend to other transferable devices.) Then we will propose some solutions to bypass the issues highlighted in the first part of the section.
To set the basis of the discussions, in Fig. 6 , we first recall the PUFOT protocol from [4] , an OT protocol based on PUFs. 3 We simplified the description of the protocols as follows: 1). we are assuming non-noisy PUFs (which allows to get rid of the fuzzy extraction); 2). we removed the multiple OT capabilities. It is fairly easy to check that our observations extend to the original PUFOT protocol. In this way, we treat PUFs as access-controlled random oracles. (Malicious PUFs could later be introduced as arbitrary oracles.) Basically, the receiver initializes a PUF, gets one random
output: s (c, PUF(c)) pair, and hands over the PUF to the sender. 4 The sender selects two values x 0 and x 1 and sends them to the receiver. The receiver responds by v = c ⊕ x b which perfectly hides b. The sender computes r 0 = PUF(v ⊕ x 0 ) and r 1 = PUF(v ⊕ x 1 ) as one of these must be the r known by the receiver. The receiver cannot know both since he cannot predict x 0 ⊕ x 1 . Finally, the sender used r 0 and r 1 to encrypt s 0 and s 1 respectively. The receiver is then able to decrypt s b .
Two Issues in UC-security: Reusing PUFs and Authenticating Channels
Honest reuse of PUFs in PUFOT.
We now observe that the PUF instances/devices cannot be handed over again after one session of PUFOT. Indeed, if a PUF-instance is used in one session of PUFOT and then handed-over by the sender, then the first session is insecure. To see that, let us assume that a PUF instance can be reused after a session of the PUFOT with sender S and receiver R. As we know, when the session finishes, the sender S will hold the PUF. We assume that S hands over the PUF after the session. During this hand-over, the adversary that overheard the session is able to query the PUF on the value c = c ⊕ x 0 ⊕ x 1 and learn r 1−b . Then, he can decrypt s 1−b and break the OT requirements.
Malicious reuse of PUFs in PUFOT.
The PUFOT protocol is subject to relay attacks as per Def. 2, which could be seen as a malicious reuse of a PUF. So, due to Th. 3, it does not F PUF -JUC realize F OT .
Actually, there is no practical way to prevent an adversary from reusing a PUF. This entails that the PUC model [4] does not compose in the classical sense, even to the weak level of JUC.
Malleability in PUFOT and its successors.
The PUFOT protocol has another shortcoming. Namely, it makes the oblivious transfer malleable: when messages are not authenticated, a man-in-the-middle in the OT between two honest participants can transform the sdr(s 0 , s 1 ) into sdr(s 1 , s 0 ) by exchanging S 0 and S 1 and by replacing v by v ⊕ x 0 ⊕ x 1 : rcv(b) will obtain s 1−b instead of s b . This only requires the capability to corrupt the communication between the two participants. So, this property shall be a concern for the practicality of PUFOT.
When using PUFOT to implement a bit commitment [4] , this translates into an man-in-the-middle attack to transform the commitment to b to a commitment to 1 − b.
A similar problem occurs in the [23] protocol. (See Appendix A for details.) The same goes for the commitment protocol of [11, 12] . Although these protocols are UC-secure, this observation shows that it is not the case without the authenticated channel assumption. This is clearly stated in [4, 11, 12] , but it is not mentioned in [23] .
There could be another subtle form of malleability which could be a concern in practice: assume a man-in-the-middle adversary who could substitute the PUF which is handed over by R to S. Concretely, the adversary substitutes the PUF in a way that he runs independently a receiver protocol with S using a randomb, finishing by giving sb, and a sender protocol with R, using two stringss 0 and s 1 such thatsb = f (sb) and the other string s 1−b is random. Finally, R receives f (s b ) if b =b and something random otherwise. This is still a malleability problem. It applies to all protocols using PUFs. Fortunately, the PUF formalisation does not allow substituting the PUF during the hand-over process. Indeed, when P i hands over a PUF to P j , upon reception, F PUF tells P j that the PUF was sent by P i , and F PUF also delivers a receipt to P i saying that the PUF was well received by P j . So, the PUF which is sent by R must be the one received by S, even in a protocol under attack. So, there is an intrinsic authentication of PUFs in the handover process of F PUF and this can be used to avoid the authenticated channel assumption. Even assuming a weaker PUF formalisation where the PUF delivery could be corrupted, the authors of [23] proposed a way to avoid this attack based on the unpredictability of PUFs.
Strengthening PUFOT (still using authenticated channels)
We will avoid relay attacks by strengthening the PUFOT protocol. Our Strengthened PUF Oblivious Transfer protocol (SPOT) is depicted in Fig. 7 . Essentially, we bind the PUF query to the sender S by adding S in the query. As one can see, this is a minor change, and it brings more security. We consider an environment Z and an adversary A in a JUC setting, and we want to construct an ideal-world adversary Sim. This Sim runs a simulationĀ of A to simulate the corrupted participants as in the real world.Ā will also have to interact with F PUF . Since neither any honest participant nor the environment is assumed to interact with F PUF , Sim needs not hand over any PUF. He just uses F PUF for simulating the interaction with real PUFs. The hand-over processing is simulated. Sim also has to interact with F OT on behalf of corrupted participants and to feedĀ with communications between honest participants (since we assume the authenticated channel UC framework).
To runĀ, Sim needs to simulate some honest participantsS j and R i while the ideal participants S j and R i (with inputs unknown to Sim) are interacting with F OT . In what follows, we consider
the collection of the views of Z, A, all honest S j and R i in the real world, and
the collection of the views of Z and Sim in the ideal world. (Since the ideal S j and R i are just forwarding inputs from Z, we can ignore their views which are redundant with the one of Z.) We denote by V Z the first view in a collection V . So, Views real (Z, A,S,R) Z = View real (Z). Below, we construct Views sim as a function Views sim = f (Views ideal (Z, Sim)) such that Views real (Z, A,S,R) and Views sim are indistinguishable and that View ideal (Z) = (Views sim ) Z . We deduce from this construction that View ideal (Z) is indistinguishable from View real (Z), which is what we had to prove.
To prove indistinguishability, we just have to say that the inputs and responses from F PUF have a correct distribution and that running the real world on the same input produces the same views.
To define Views sim = f (Views ideal (Z, Sim)), we just concatenate View ideal (Z), View ideal (Ā), and the (reconstructed) views of each honestS j andR i . All is computed from View ideal (S im) by runningĀ and the simulator for the honestS j andR i , except for View ideal (Z) which is already part of Views ideal (Z, Sim). As we will see,S j andR i are simulated but we can reconstruct a meaningful view for S j and R i afterwards.
To make the simulation work, Sim has to simulate the honest participantsS j andR i interacting withĀ. One problem is that Sim is not always aware of which inputs S j and R i receive from Z. Another issue for Sim is to simulate the interaction with F OT on behalf of corrupted participants interacting with honest ones. The interaction between two malicious participants is fully taken care of bȳ
A.
Incidentally, we notice that Sim is aware of all interaction (queries and answers) with all PUFs.
To define Sim and f , we maintain two sets Q and Q of (sid PUF , q)
queries. The set Q includes actual queries to the PUF while the set Q contains undecided queries, which could have been made by some honest receiver. These two sets are originally empty. WheneverĀ is making a query to PUF, the corresponding pair is added in Q. During the simulation for a honest receiverR i , some undetermined queries will be added in Q as detailed below.
To simulate a honestR i , Sim simply takes a fresh PUF, waits for some x 0 , x 1 , and selects a random string v. Then, Sim queries both PUF(S v ⊕ x 0 ) and PUF(S v ⊕ x 1 ) and inserts both queries in Q .
To reconstruct the view of R i in Views sim = f (Views ideal (Z, Sim)), we take c = v ⊕ x b as the random coins of R i (where b is computed from View ideal (Z)) and the response from PUF to the query corresponding to b. Clearly, the coins have a correct distribution and the simulation is perfect. If S is corrupted, Sim further has to submit some s 0 , s 1 to F OT for R i . After receiving s 0 , s 1 , Sim can get both s 0 and s 1 and submit them to F OT , and the ideal R i will get s b like in the real world.
To simulate a honestS j , we pick x 0 and x 1 normally and wait for v. The corresponding PUF is now handed by a honest sender and not supposed to be queried any more byĀ. We can check if the queries PUF(S v ⊕ x 0 ) and PUF(S v ⊕ x 1 ) exist in Q or Q . Then, there are two cases to analyse.
In the first case, there is at most one of the two queries in Q ∪ Q and we can set b to the value such that PUF(S v ⊕ x b ) is the existing query. If there is none, we just set b to a random value. So, Sim can make the corrupted R i send b to F OT to deduce s b . Then, we construct s b based on s b and set s 1−b to a random string. Whatever A is doing is equivalent to running the real world with a correct s b and some random s 1−b . ButĀ cannot have any access to the correct value of s 1−b due to the non-existent query to the PUF. So, the executions produce equivalent results. In the reconstructed view of S j , the non-queried PUF value is set to s 1−b ⊕ s 1−b where s 1−b is taken from View ideal (Z). Since the PUF output is random and the PUF is no longer used, this reconstructed view perfectly simulates S j running with input s 0 and s 1 .
In the second case, both possible queries are in Q ∪ Q . Note that the PUF handed by S cannot have been queried afterS j selected x 0 and x 1 . Since the probability that x 0 ⊕ x 1 matches the XOR between two existing queries is negligible, both queries cannot be in Q ∪ Q at this time and none can later be added in Q: it can only be the case that some queries were added in Q afterwards. If only one is added in Q and the other is already existing, then it means that a simulation for a honest receiver managed to select some random vector hitting an existing query. This occurs with negligible probability. So, the two values must have been added in Q . Clearly, this comes from the above simulation of a honest receiverR i who is undecided about b and who received somex 0 andx 1 . The queries have form S v ⊕x b . Due to this structure, it must be the case that these two participants are really interacting with each other and have seen some protocol messages x 0 , x 1 ,v (for the sender) andx 0 ,x 1 , v (for the receiver) leading to the same pairs {v ⊕ x 0 ,v ⊕ x 1 } and {v ⊕x 0 = v ⊕x 1 }. So, x 0 ⊕ x 1 =x 0 ⊕x 1 . Since sid PUF is the same, they also have seen the same PUF. By looking at the receiver protocol, we can see that the adversary cannot know any v ⊕x i before he got v from the receiver. This occurs after givingx 0 andx 1 . If either of the possible values ofv ⊕ x i is known beforeS j selects x 0 and x 1 , then v must have been released by the receiver before. So, it is unlikely that x 0 ⊕ x 1 =x 0 ⊕x 1 . Therefore, the probability that the adversary queries the PUF with either of the possible values ofv ⊕ x j , before x 0 and x 1 have been released, is negligible. Similarly, he has no chance to query the PUF after learning these values. So, he knows nothing about the decryption keys for s 0 and s 1 . The simulatorS j can thus use some random s 0 and s 1 . The reconstructed view for S j works as above, by changing the table value of the PUF. Since s 0 and s 1 cannot be corrupted, the receiverR i must receive them unchanged. In this situation, we have to change slightly the simulatorR i which was described before: indeed, we cannot extract s 0 and s 1 from these random values. But fortunately, we do not need to submit s 0 and s 1 to F OT . This was done by the ideal S j already.
Note that the above theorem (and proof) only holds in JUC, but does not hold in GUC. This is because, in JUC, all sessions and the PUF usages inter-sessions will have one single, all-encompassing interface with the environment, as if they were all part of one macrosession; in GUC, by contrast, the environment (and thus the combined adversarial body) has fine-tuned, inter-session access to the PUF and has separate access/control to and over each individual session. Thus, the simulation in the proof above would default in GUC.
CONCLUSIONS
It is important to know not only what we can realize with (UC-)setup devices, but also what shortfalls they bring to the crypto world. In that sense, in this paper, we looked at UC-setup devices that may hinder EUC/JUC realization. We singled these out and characterized them formally. We thuswise denote the class of transferable setups; informally, these are setup devices which do not (publicly) disclose if they have been maliciously passed on. A subset of these are the well-known physical unclonable functions (PUFs).
We proved that one cannot realize oblivious transfer (OT) or any other "interesting" 2-party protocol using transferable setups in the EUC model. Furthermore, if relay attacks are possible then oblivious transfer cannot be realized in the JUC model either. As a by-product, we show that the protocols proposed built with PUFs by Brzuska et al. at CRYPTO 2011, by Ostrovsky et al. at EUROCRYPT 2013, by Damgård and Scafuro at ASIACRYPT 2013, are subject to relaying thus not being JUC secure. In addition to this, they all need authenticated channels. We also discuss this need, to some extend.
We showed how to strengthen one of these PUF-based protocols to make them JUC-secure.
